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“CHINA’S FOOD INDUSTRY IN CRISIS: A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE FSL AND  
CHINA’S ENFORCEMENT OBSTACLES” 
 
INA ILIN-SCHNEIDER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
"Food is essential, and safety should be a top priority. Food safety 
is closely related to people's lives and health, economic 
development and social harmony. We must create a food safety 
system of self-disciplined food companies with integrity, effective 
government supervision and broad public support to improve 
overall food safety." 
Premier Li Keqiang, Head of the National Food Safety 
Commission, State Council, People Republic of China.
1
 
 
Melamine contaminated milk, toxic bean sprouts, aluminum dumplings, glow-in-the-dark 
pork, gutter oil, cadmium rice, toxic preserved fruits, fluorescent bleached mushrooms, fake eggs 
and the list goes on and on – this has been the sad reality of the Chinese food industry for the 
past several years.
2
 Millions of Chinese citizens are paralyzed with fear of another food safety 
scare and doubt about the quality and safety of their next meal. More and more parents and 
caretakers around China are justifiably concerned about feeding their infants baby formula 
produced in China. Public trust in the Chinese food industry, especially in recent years, has been 
continuously dwindling, prompting officials to step up their efforts of improving overall food 
safety.  
                                                            
1 Vice premier orders efforts to improve food safety, CHINADAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
04/20/content_9749703.htm (last updated Apr. 20, 2010). 
2 Yanzhong Huang, China's Corrupt Food Chain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/opinion/chinas-corrupt-food-chain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
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Following the devastating incident in 2008 involving melamine contaminated baby 
formula, which killed six infants and sickened more than three hundred thousand others,
3
 the 
National People’s Congress (“NPC”) felt the public pressure to develop a comprehensive plan, 
which culminated in the passing of the 2009 Food Safety Law (“FSL”). 4 The new piece of 
legislation aimed to prevent and resolve future incidences of food safety violations. It was an 
attempt to restore the reputation and the public trust in the Chinese food industry.  
This article argues that the enactment of the FSL has several significant implications for 
the Chinese food industry. First, the FSL creates a national monitoring system for food safety 
risks to monitor incidents of food contamination and imposes a mandate on the central and local 
government agencies to formulate and administer the FSL’s rules and regulations.5 Second, the 
law tightens and streamlines national food safety standards, by placing the Ministry of Health 
(“MOH”) in charge of developing and publicizing new national food safety standards that are 
scientific, reasonable, safe and reliable.
6
 Finally, the FSL imposes more rigorous penalties on 
food producers and traders who engage in illegal food safety practices and defines the illegal acts 
of government officials that would trigger a punishment under the FSL.
7
  
However, the FSL has seen only limited success. The food poisoning cases in China are 
still quite common and public mistrust in China’s food industry is high. This article takes the 
position that, even though the FSL is an important piece of legislation, the law, as it was drafted, 
has several limitations. First, the national food safety standards are obsolete, lacking, 
                                                            
3 See Céline Gossner, Jørgen Schlundt, Peter Embarek, et al., The Melamine Incident: Implications for International 
Food and Feed Safety, Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 117, No. 12, Dec., 2009, at 1803-1808, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30249857.  
4 See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Gou Shipin Anquan Fa (Shi Xing), Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009, effective June 1, 2009,  (P.R.C) 
[hereinafter Food Safety Law], available at  http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200903/146327461.pdf. 
5 Id. art. 11. 
6 Id. art. 1, 7-10. 
7 Id. art. 84, 91-93. 
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inconsistent, overlap or are duplicates of already existing standards.
8
 Second, the FSL failed to 
cut or consolidate the number of agencies, despite the FSL’s efforts to nationalize China’s 
monitoring and enforcement system through the Food Safety Committee (“FSC”). Third, the law 
is only partially successful at preventing future incidences of food safety violations. Even though 
the FSL does a relatively good job in identifying punishable illegal activities, there are no 
provisions referring to the issue of deterrence.  
In addition to FSL’s limitations, the Chinese government faces several substantial 
enforcement obstacles. This article argues that while the FSL proposes solutions to China’s food 
safety problems, it will have to overcome serious implementation obstacles, such as: local 
economic protectionism; corruption, unscrupulous practices and lack of integrity; and 
environment influences on food safety. 
Part I of this article examines the FSL’s vital provisions and recognizes the FSL’s partial 
success. Part II addresses FSL’s limitations and offers suggestions for how the law can be 
expanded to address the root causes of food safety problems. Part III exposes the obstacles the 
Chinese government faces in enforcing the FSL. In Part IV, the article concludes, that before 
China can regain the public trust in the safety of the Chinese foods, the government needs to step 
up its efforts not only legislatively, but must also develop effective enforcement mechanisms.  
I. The Food Safety Law Of 2009 
The public outcry over the death of six infants and the devastating long-term injuries of 
as many as three hundred thousand others, who consumed the melamine tainted infant formula, 
has prompted the passage of China’s Food Safety Law.9 On February 28, 2009, after a five year 
drafting period, China’s NPC Standing Committee passed the first comprehensive Food Safety 
                                                            
8 Yang Lina, China punishes food safety criminals in 2011, XINHUA, Feb. 09, 2012, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-02/09/c_131401041.htm.  
9 Gossner at al., supra note 3. 
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Law (“FSL”), which entered into effect on June 1, 2009. 10 This section highlights significant 
FSL provisions that have had the highest impact on the Chinese food industry since FSL’s 
enactment.  
 
 
 
A. Centralized Surveillance and Assessment of Food Safety Risks 
Recognizing China’s inefficient food monitoring system as one of the main causes of 
previous food safety violations, the NPC, as “the highest organ of state power,”11 decided to 
create a new governmental department solely dedicated to food safety oversight and enforcement 
of applicable standards and regulations.
12
 The new department, accordingly named the Food 
Safety Committee, was an essential ingredient in trying to prevent and resolve future incidences 
of food safety violations.
13
 To assure the creation of the FSC, the NPC included Article 4 in the 
FSL, which requires the State Council
14
 to establish the FSC and put it in charge of supervising 
and coordinating the work of five regulatory departments under the State Council, including 
                                                            
10 See Food Safety Law, supra note 4. 
11 See Susan Lawrence, Michael Martin, Understanding China’s Political System, Congressional Research Service, 
March 20, 2013, at 7, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf. (The constitution also gives the NPC 
numerous powers, such as the power to amend the constitution, supervise its enforcement, enact and amend laws, 
ratify and abrogate treaties, approve state budget and plans for national economic and social development, elect and 
impeach top officials of the state and judiciary and supervise the work of  the State Central Military Commission, 
the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. In practice, however, the NPC has those 
powers only on paper due to the dual identity of many of its deputies and the way they are elected.) 
12 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 4. See also Shan Juan, New department devoted to food safety, 
CHINADAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/food/2013-03/05/content_16278075.htm. (last updated March 05, 
2013). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. See also Lawrence, supra note 11, at 31. (State Council is the highest administrative body in the state. It 
includes State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office (“SCLAO”), which is regularly involved in the formulation of 
national laws and regulations. SCLAO “drafts the government’s legislative agenda on a year-to-year basis and then 
works with relevant government ministries and agencies to implement the agenda, including overseeing the drafting 
of regulations and laws.”) 
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departments of health, agriculture, quality supervision, industry and commerce administration, 
and food and drug supervision.
15
  
According to Liu Xirong, the vice chairman of the NPC Law Committee, the FSC’s 
primary task was to function as a “high level coordinating organization” and to identify and 
solve food safety problems within China’s food safety system before they lead to tragedies.16 In 
2010, the State Council has formed the FSC, consisting of three vice premiers    Li Keqiang, Hui 
Liangyu and ang  ishan    and a dozen minister-level officials.17 As mandated under the 
FSL,
18
 the State Council exercised its authority directing FSC’s high-profile panel of government 
officials to analyze China’s food safety situation, guide and coordinate food safety work, make 
food safety policies, and urge the relevant departments to fulfill their responsibilities in food 
supervision.”19 
To improve the coordination among regulatory departments under the State Council, the 
FSL has conferred the primary authority to formulate and enforce the national monitoring plan 
on food safety risks to the MOH.
20
 In addition, the FSL directed the local government executive 
departments of health to formulate and enforce those plans within their respective jurisdiction in 
accordance with the national monitoring plans on food safety risks.
21
 Essentially, the MOH has 
                                                            
15 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 4.   
16 China to set up central food safety commission, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the U.S., Feb. 25, 
2009, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t539233.htm.  
17 China's determination to ensure food safety, China.org., Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-
02/11/content_19411151.htm.  
18 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 4. (The FSL does not provide any guidance regarding the membership or the 
duties of the FSC. It is up to the State Council to decide how the FSC should be staffed and what responsibilities and 
duties it should have.) 
19 Cai Hong, Food safety system needs more bite, CHINADAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-
04/14/content_15046822.htm (last updated April 14, 2012). 
20 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 11. (Even though, MOH has the leading role in governing food safety, it must 
work with the relevant State Council departments.) 
21 Id. art. 5,11,70. (The FSL directs the local governments to define the regulatory responsibilities in accordance 
with the national standards and the State Council regulations and to establish and enforce a food safety 
accountability system, which must oversee the regulatory food safety agencies. To put it differently, the FSL places 
the local governments on the forefront of food inspections requiring a system of food safety regulations at every step 
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the primary responsibility for the overall food safety coordination; it must evaluate food safety 
risks, formulate food safety standards, issue public notifications on food safety, develop 
accreditation norms for food testing agencies and investigate major food safety incidents.
22
 If the 
MOH discovers any problems relating to food safety, it is required under the FSL to organize 
inspections and food safety risk assessments immediately.
23
 To offer technological and scientific 
support for the regulators in evaluating, monitoring, and communicating food security risks and 
food safety standards, as well as issuing early warnings, the MOH has launched the National 
Center for Food Safety Risk Assessment (“Center”) in 2011.24 Since then, the Center has 
established more than three hundred monitoring locations across the country, including sites in 
supermarkets and farm produce markets.
25
 
The national monitoring plan on food safety risks has shown some noteworthy success in 
detecting food safety violations.
26
 In 2011, the FSC has reported that in response to concerns 
about the use of harmful food additives, the official investigators have inspected close to six 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
in the food chain. If a food safety incident occurs, local governments have the obligation to formulate and submit 
emergency plans within their jurisdictions to the higher level government based on relevant laws, regulations and 
emergency plan of the higher level government.) 
22 Id. art 4, 13-14. (In respect to other regulatory agencies, the FSL requires the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and  uarantine (“GA SI ”), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(“SAIC”) and the State Food and Drug Administration (“SFDA”) to regulate food manufacturing, food distribution 
and catering service, respectively, in accordance with the set national standards. The FSL requires the MOH in 
conjunction with GAQSIQ, SAIC and SFDA to formulate and enforce national assessment mechanisms for food 
safety risks. The MOH is responsible for organizing scientifically conducted food safety risk assessments.) 
23 Id. art. 14-16, 72. (GAQSIQ, SAIC and SFDA must make recommendations on food safety risk assessment and 
offer relevant information and documents. If the inspections and assessments confirm that a food is dangerous, the 
regulatory agencies (GAQSIQ, SAIC and SFDA) must take immediate actions to stop consumption of the unsafe 
food. In extraordinary cases the executive department of health is authorized to immediately formulate or modify the 
applicable food safety standards.) 
24 China forms food safety risk assessment center, Chinese Government’s Official eb Portal, Oct. 14, 2011, 
http://english.gov.cn/2011-10/14/content_1969694.htm.  
25 Id. See also, Zhen Jinran, High hopes for new food safety monitoring, CHINADAILY, March 15, 2013, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-03/15/content_16310118.htm (A researcher at the China National 
Center for Food Risk Assessment under the Ministry of Health has stated earlier this year that “[a]ll of China's 
provinces and at least half of its cities and counties will have monitoring sites by 2013.”). 
26 Austin Ramzy, China Food Safety: Big Crackdown, but Big Concerns Remain, TIME, Aug. 5, 2011, 
http://world.time.com/2011/08/05/china-food-safety-big-crackdown-but-big-concerns-remain/. 
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million food and additive producers.
27
 As a result of these investigations, Chinese authorities 
have arrested 2,000 individuals and ordered closings of 4,900 businesses suspected to have been 
involved in food safety violations.
28
 The successful enforcement was a product of an effective 
collaboration of several regulatory executive departments under the State Council, including 
agricultural, industrial, commercial, quality control and food authorities. 
29
 Nevertheless, as 
noted by China’s Premier en Jiabo, “China's food industry is still suffering from 
unstandardized management and many hidden safety risks.”30  
Accordingly, reflecting continuous efforts to improve food safety, the State Council has 
laid out measures in June 2012, calling for strengthening regulatory oversight and imposing 
harsher punishments on violators.
31
 In particular, the State Council has emphasized the need for 
the government to enhance supervision by establishing “an efficient mechanism that [would] 
cover all links in the food industry.”32 One such mechanism that closes the regulatory oversight 
gap is the state licensing requirement for food producers and traders.
 33
 Under the FSL’ 
mandatory state licensing system, any organization or individual involved in the food business is 
required to obtain a proper license.
34
 Reflecting the seriousness of combating oversight 
loopholes, the Standing Committee of the 13
th
 Beijing Municipal People's Congress passed a bill 
                                                            
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Anne Tang, China introduces measures to enhance food safety, Chinese Government’s Official eb Portal, June 
13, 2012, http://english.gov.cn/2012-06/13/content_2160318.htm. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 29. 
34 Id. art 29, 31. 43-48. (The relevant executive regulatory departments at the county level and above have the 
authority to grant or deny a licensing application upon reviewing the application and inspecting the applicant’s 
production or trading facilities, if necessary. In addition, the FSL requires a state license for the production of novel 
foods, new food additive varieties or new food related products. The safety of the new foods and food additives must 
be reviewed by the MOH.) 
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earlier this year that went into effect on April 1, 2013.
35
 The bill revokes state licenses issued to 
food producers and vendors who produce or sell unsafe foods, and effectively bans these food 
producers and vendors from the sector for life.
36
  
In addition to defining responsibilities of central and local governments with respect to 
food safety regulations, the FSL has also embraces the involvement of non-governmental third 
parties.
37
 In particular, the FSL requires food producers and traders to strictly follow the 
applicable laws and food safety standards and mandates food industry associations to tighten 
their self-discipline.
 38
 In line with the FSL mandates, the State Council urged Chinese food 
industries in 2012 to “accept primary responsibility in ensuring food quality and safety.”39 This 
responsibility includes regular inspections to ensure that preventive measures are implemented 
and to eliminate potential food safety risks as soon as possible.
40
 The FSL also encourages 
media’s and consumers’ involvement in food safety enforcement.41 China’s latest efforts to 
“encourage the public to report illegal activities [] to control and eliminate potential safety risks 
concerning food and medicine” have been to provide citizens with monetary rewards for 
legitimate reports on food safety violations.
42
  
                                                            
35 Beijing to roll out tough food safety law, Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-
12/27/c_132067702.htm (last updated Dec. 27, 2012) (Individuals, companies, or executives of companies 
responsible for food safety problems will be banned from operating in the food industry for five years after their 
firm’s license revocation.) 
36 Id. 
37 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 1, 7-10. 
38 Id 
39 Tang, supra note 28.  
40 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 60, 70, 71. (The FSL eliminated the food safety inspection exemption, 
subjecting food industries to the same national standards across the board.) 
41 Id. art. 1, 7-10. 
42 China to reward food and drug whistleblowers, CHINADAILY, Jan. 15, 2013, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-01/15/content_16122373.htm (According to SFDA circular, China will 
give up to 300,000 yuan  ($48,000) cash reward to individuals for their reports on food safety violations.) However, 
it is questionable if people will in fact come forward, particularly because China is known for punishing activists for 
disturbing “social harmony”. See also Andrew Jacobs, China Sentences Activist in Milk Scandal to Prison, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/world/asia/11beijing.html?_r=0 (In 2010 China has 
sentenced Zhao Lianhai, whose son was injured by the tainted formula in 2008, for speaking to foreign reporters, 
organizing a website for aggrieved parents and inciting social disorder.)   
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The struggle with achieving effective supervision over Chinese food industry has spurred 
a wave of technological innovations. For example, electronic food-safety tracking system can be 
used to check the manufacturer’s identity.43 According to Sun Pishu, the CEO of the Chinese 
information-technology company Inspur Group Co Ltd, “control[ing] food quality without the 
use of technology” and monitoring foods’ origins absent a food-tracking system is nearly 
impossible or at best enormously challenging."
44
 Not surprisingly, the hope is that technological 
advancements will aid Chinese regulators to better monitor the food industry and help consumers 
to hold food manufacturers accountable for the quality of their products through increased 
transparency. 
B. Unified Food Safety Standards, Stricter Controls over Food Additives 
 
Frequent media announcements about toxic Chinese food products highlight the need for 
uniform national food safety standards in the Chinese food industry. Thus, to protect public 
health, the NPC included important provisions in the FSL requiring the MOH to develop and 
publicize mandatory national food safety standards.
45 
The standards are required to have a 
scientific basis and be reasonable, safe and reliable.
46
 In addition, the standards must be subject 
to review and approval by the Food Safety National Standards Evaluation Committee 
(“Evaluation Committee”), consisting of an elaborate expert panel and the representatives from 
relevant executive regulatory departments under the State Council.
47
 In December 2009, the 
                                                            
43 Pliny Han, Govt set to establish food safety program, Chinese Government’s Official eb Portal, March 15, 
2012, http://english.gov.cn/2012-03/15/content_2092545.htm 
44 Id. 
45 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 20, 21. 24,25 (The pesticide residue limits and their testing methods must be 
developed by the MOH and the Ministry of Agriculture (“MOA”) under the State Council. The complete list of food 
safety standards can be found under Article 20. In addition, the FSL requires the local executive departments and 
food industries to develop and strengthen local and industry standards, respectively, to ensure food quality and 
safety.) 
46 Id. art. 18. 
47 Id. art. 23. (The amount of discretion held by the MOH is unclear. The FSL states simply that the expert panel 
must include experts in the field of medicine, agriculture, food, nutrition.) 
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Chinese government has gathered a panel of forty two experts in the fields of hygiene, 
agriculture, food and nutrition to conduct risk assessment on food safety.
48
   
Last year, the MOH and seven other departments have jointly released the “12th Five-
Year Plan for National Food Safety Standards” (“Plan”), which recognized the MOH’s 
significant achievements on the subject of food safety and China’s overall efforts to upgrade 
regulations and strengthen food safety standards.
49
 The deputy director of Health Supervision 
Bureau of the MOH, Su Zhi, has stated that the administration is not only “making efforts to 
expand the number of qualified personnel from 93,000 to more than 100,000 by the end of 
2015,” but also “make[s] special efforts to set standards for testing various contaminants, food 
additives and animal drug residue in food production by then."
50
 Additionally, the MOH has 
made significant progress in streamlining and integrating existing food standards
51
 on foods like 
vegetable oil, meat products, milk and dairy products, and promulgating 269 new national food 
safety standards for milk, food additive use and pesticide residue limits among other items.
52
  
Despite increased efforts to strengthen food safety standards, the MOH received plenty of 
criticism especially in relation to the new standards for milk that became effective on June 1, 
2010.
53
 Surprisingly, the new dairy standards were increased in the maximum limit for bacteria 
                                                            
48 China Sets Up Expert Panel to Assess Food Safety, CHINADAILY, Dec. 9, 2009, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-12/09/content_9147922.htm. 
49 12th Five Year Plan for National Food Safety Standard (herein “12th Five-Year Plan”), GAIN Report, June 28, 
2012, available at http://gain.fas.usda.gov. (The 12th Five-Year Plan is a document that sets economic and social 
policy objectives and incorporates international standards and experiences in administering the standards. The Plan 
is “formulated in accordance with the Food Safety Law, its implementing regulations and plans related to national 
food safety supervision for the purposes of carrying out national food safety standard work and improving the 
standard system.” The Plan is divided into several sections, which focus on China’s achievements and weaknesses, 
as well as on the guiding ideology, basic principles, objectives and tasks, as they relate to food safety. The Plan is 
mostly aspirational in character, but provides several practical considerations for how to achieve food safety.) 
50 China forms food safety risk assessment center, supra note 24.  
51 12th Five Year Plan, supra note 51. (Prior to the FSL, China had over 2,000 national standards, over 2,900 
industrial standards and over 1,200 local standards on food, food additive and food-related products.) 
52 Id.  
53 Ministry defends controversial milk standard, China.org., Dec. 1, 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-
12/01/content_24050529.htm. 
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in raw milk, or the aerobic plate count, and lowered in the protein content requirement, reflecting 
one of the weakest standards for milk in the world.
54
 This decision seems somewhat 
counterintuitive. Instead of encouraging dairy producers to improve their milk production 
practices, the MOH decided to reduce milk quality requirements in order to accommodate dairy 
farmers’ lower benchmarks. However, responding to the criticisms, the MOH official, Zhang 
Xudong, defended the standards stating that the presence of dairy producers in the drafting 
committee was important because their livelihood potentially depended on it.
55
 In addition, 
advocates of the new standard and the dairy farmers believe that the reduced standard is a 
practical compromise in light of China’s small scale milk production and different feeding 
environments, which reflect large disparities in the types and quality of dairy cows within the 
dairy industry.
56
 Nevertheless, this compromise does not affect the increased controls for 
melamine contamination, which requires manufacturers to keep complete records of inputs and 
to test all dairy products for melamine prior to distribution.
57
  
C. Increased Penalties For Non-Compliance 
China’s reaction to frequent food safety violations has been increasingly resolute and the 
administration continuously imposes harsher punishments against food safety violators and 
corrupt or underperforming food inspection agencies and government officials.
58
  
                                                            
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Dairy and Products Annual, GAIN Report (Oct. 22, 2010), available at http://gain.fas.usda.gov. See also Dexter 
Roberts, China Sets Up a Food Safety Super-Regulator, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, March 14, 2014, 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-14/china-sets-up-a-food-safety-super-regulator 
 (“China is home to an estimated 200 million families that farm, each cultivating an average plot of 1.5 acres, as well 
as a half-million food processing companies, most with fewer than 10 employees. The small scale of most 
agriculture and food processing means the owners have limited resources to invest in the advanced techniques that 
could ensure better quality.”) 
57 Id. 
58 Fang, China court upholds death sentences in milk scandal, XINHUA, March 26, 2009, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/26/content_11078553.htm. 
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In line with the central government’s severe punishment agenda, the FSL subjects food 
manufacturers and distributors, who engage in illegal food production or trading, to confiscation 
of illegal gains and benefits, including food and food additives illegally produced or traded, as 
well as tools and equipment used during the illegal food production or trading.
59
 In addition, the 
law imposes penalties and fines on the violators and authorizes revocation of business licenses, 
either temporarily or permanently.
60
 In the same year the FSL was passed, China has revoked 
6,045 food production licenses from 5,654 producers, reflecting major governmental efforts to 
improve food safety in the country.
61
  
Acknowledging that corruption and bribery have plagued China’s food industry for the 
past several years,
62
 the NPC included provisions in the FSL addressing these issues.
63
 
Specifically, the provisions direct higher authorities to revoke the certificates of qualification 
from food inspection agencies or personnel issuing fraudulent inspection reports or publishing 
false advertising.
64
 The provisions also authorize the removal or dismissal of the managers or the 
personnel directly involved in the fraud or false advertising.
65
 To further insure that the food 
inspection agencies comply with the set standards, the FSL prohibits managers or personnel 
directly involved in fraudulent inspection reports to work as food inspectors for ten years after 
the incident.
66
 Similarly, if local government officials or regulatory executive departments fail to 
perform their duties in accordance with the law, abuse their authority or engage in corruption, 
                                                            
59 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 84. 
60 Id. art. 84-97. 
61 Zhu Zhe, 6,045 food licenses revoked for quality problems, CHINADAILY, Jan. 7, 2010, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/07/content_9281069.htm. 
62 See, Bin Dong and Benno Torgler, The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China (June 21, 2010), FEEM 
Working Paper No. 72.2010, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628107 (“The Chinese Government has 
admitted that corruption “is now worse than during any other period since New China was founded in 1949. It has 
spread into the Party, into Government administration and into every part of society, including politics, economy, 
ideology and culture.”) 
63 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 91-93. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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and a serious food safety incident occurs, the FSL demands removal, demotion or dismissal of 
those directly responsible.
67
  
In addition to fines and removal of responsible parties, the FSL subjects any violator, 
who commits a serious food safety violation to criminal prosecution.
68
 Although, the FSL does 
not directly discuss criminal penalties, it does refer to the application of the Criminal Law of 
China.
69
 On February 25, 2011, Hu Jintao, China’s former top official, announced the 8th 
Amendment to the Criminal Law of China.
70
 The amendments came into force on May 1, 2011
71
 
and included several significant food safety revisions, such as Article 143,
72
 144
73
 and 408A
74
.  
Under the revised Law, food producers and distributors, who produce or sell unsafe 
foods, which might cause any serious food poisoning or a serious food borne disease will face up 
                                                            
67 Id. art. 95. (The relevant authorities include authority for supervision and authority for appointment and 
dismissal.) 
68 Id. art. 98. 
69 Id.  
70 Amendment (VIII) to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (herein “Criminal Law Amendment 
III”), Adopted at the 19th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress of the 
People’s Republic of China (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://27.151.119.113/cms/html/english/2011-12-
12/258191.html.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. (Article 143 states: “ hoever produces or sells food not up to the food safety standards which may cause any 
serious food poisoning accident or any other serious food-borne disease shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not 
more than 3 years or criminal detention and a fine; if any serious damage is caused to the people’s health or there is 
any other serious circumstance, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 3 years but not more than 7 
years and a fine; or if there are especially serious consequences, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 
7 years or life imprisonment and a fine or forfeiture of property.”) 
73 Id. (Article 144 is amended as: “ hoever mixes poisonous or harmful non-food raw materials into food produced 
or sold or knowingly sells food mixed with poisonous or harmful non-food raw materials shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment of not more than 5 years and a fine; if any serious damage is caused to the people’s health or there is 
any other serious circumstance, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 5 years but not more than 10 
years and a fine; or if any human death is caused or there is any other especially serious circumstance, shall be 
punished according to the provisions of Article 141 of this Law.” Paragraph 1 of Article 141 is amended as: 
“ hoever produces or sells bogus drugs shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not more than 3 years or criminal 
detention and a fine; if any serious damage is caused to the people’s health or there is any other serious 
circumstance, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 3 years but not more than 10 years and a fine; or if 
any human death is caused or there is any other especially serious circumstance, shall be sentenced to imprisonment 
of not less than 10 years, life imprisonment or death penalty and a fine or forfeiture of property.”) 
74 Id. (Article 408A: “ here a state functionary with food safety supervision and management functions abuses his 
powers or neglects his duties, if any serious food safety accident or other serious consequence is caused, he shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment of not more than 5 years or criminal detention; or if any especially serious consequence 
is caused, be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 5 years but not more than 10 years.”) 
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to three years in prison.
 75
 If the unsafe food causes a serious damage to the people’s health, the 
sentence will be increased to up to seven years, and in extraordinarily serious cases even beyond 
seven years.
76
 The punishment is more severe for those who “mix poisonous or harmful non-
food raw materials into food produced or sold or knowingly sell food mixed with poisonous or 
harmful non-food raw materials.” 77 Those individuals can face life imprisonment and even death 
penalty in the most severe situations.
78 
Recognizing a growing prevalence of corruption in 
China’s food industry,79 the amendments impose criminal penalties of up to ten years on state 
regulators with food safety supervision and management authority, who knowingly abuse their 
power or negligently abandon their duties as regulators.
80
 
These amendments were implemented to protect “people’s livelihood” according to the 
statements by the NPC’s Commission for Legislative Affairs, and ensure that the violators are 
held accountable for their criminal acts.
 81
 Nevertheless, the initial reports indicate that despite 
the harsh punishments under China’s Criminal Law, the country is still struggling to solve its 
food safety crisis, as evidenced by countless reports of food safety violations since the passage of 
the FSL.
 82
     
II. Limits of the 2009 Food Safety Law 
The previous section explored several key provisions in the FSL that have had the highest 
impact on the Chinese food industry.  However, the FSL has several weaknesses that limit its 
                                                            
75 Id, art. 143. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. art. 144. See also Wang Guanqun , Two executed in China over tainted milk scandal, XINHUA, Nov. 24, 
2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/24/content_12530798.htm.  
78 Id. 
79 See Dong, The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China, supra note 62. 
80 Criminal Law Amendment III, supra note 70, art. 408A. 
81 Helena Bottemiller, China Considers Tougher Food Safety Penalties, FOOD SAFETY NEWS, Dec. 22, 2010,   
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/12/china-considers-upping-criminal-food-safety-penalties/#.UToeG_Mo6Uk  
82 See John Ruwitch, China's Yili recalls tainted milk powder, shares slump, REUTERS, June 15, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/15/us-yili-recall-idUSBRE85E0DC20120615. See also, Huang, supra note 
2.     
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success in ensuring national food safety. This section fosters a detailed discussion of some of the 
major limitations of the FSL, which include problems with the uniformity of food safety 
standards, the challenges associated with having a high number of regulatory agencies, and the 
FSL’s difficulties in providing sufficient and effective incentives to discourage food safety 
violations.  
 
 
A. Problems With the Uniformity of Food Safety Standards 
The FLS’s mandatory national food safety standard system signifies a substantial 
progress toward ensuring China’s food safety. However, there is more work to be done. China’s 
12
th
 Five-Year Plan, even though aspirational, provides a framework for areas in the FSL that 
require improvement.
83
  
China’s central regulatory departments acknowledged in the 12th Five-Year Plan for 
National Food Safety Standards that China’s current standards for food safety are restrained by 
the fast-paced development and risk assessment of the food industry.
84
 To put it differently, 
safety standards that are presently in place do not match food industry’s developments. This can 
create substantial challenges for the regulators in trying to identify whether a food company 
produces food that is, in fact, safe. The FSL offers only a limited guidance in this regard. 
Specifically, the FSL emphasizes the need for “scientific, reasonable, safe and reliable” national 
standards.
85
 However, there is no mandate as to how recent the scientific basis for the standards 
                                                            
83 12th Five-Year Plan, supra note 49. 
84 Id. 
85 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 18. 
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should be. This leaves regulators enforcing standards that are outdated and lack generality and 
risk assessment.
86
  
Another difficulty facing the regulators and inspection agencies is the patchwork of 
duplicative, overlapping and inconsistent standards.
87
 This problem traces back to the period 
before the FSL’s promulgation, when different ministries separately developed food safety 
standards pursuant to their portfolios, without ever cross referencing them with other 
ministries.
88
 Even though there is some effort in the FSL to require consolidation of national 
food safety standards by the MOH among existing quality and safety standards in Articles 22 and 
23, there are still many national standards that are either lacking, inconsistent, overlap or are 
duplicates of already existing standards.
89
  
To complicate the matters, the FSL explicitly allowed local governments in autonomous 
regions and at the provincial and municipal levels,
90
 as well as food enterprises, to develop local 
and industry food safety standards, in areas where the MOH failed to develop national 
standards.
91
 Such an explicit authorization creates a risk that local and industry standards will be 
used to protect local industries.
92
 Local officials may have the incentive to either keep local food 
safety standards low, or rely on the lack of national standards and not see the necessity to 
                                                            
86 Ching-Fu Lin, Global Food Safety: Exploring Key Elements for an International Regulatory Strategy, 51 Va. J. 
Int'l L. 637, at 650-651, Jan. 29, 2011. 
87 Lina, supra note 8. 
88 Gordon Fairclough, U.N. Criticizes China on Food Safety, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122470185058359197.html. 
89 Lina, supra note 8. (Health Minister Chen Zhu admitted that amid numerous food safety scandals, China's food 
safety standards are in urgent need of improvement. Chen said that “the total number of national food standards, 
local standards and food-producing industrial standards has topped 5,000. Among them, many overlap or contradict 
each other, he added, pointing to the motivation behind the Ministry of Health's announcement last month that it will 
overhaul and streamline the current food standards list.”) 
90 ChinaToday Home Page, http://www.chinatoday.com/city/china_municipalities.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) 
(China has four municipalities, twenty three provinces and five autonomous regions.) 
91 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 24,25 
92 Ellen Peirce, and Marisa Pagnattaro, From China to Your Plate: An Analysis of New Regulatory Efforts and 
Stakeholder Responsibility to Ensure Food Safety, 2009, at 12, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1565511. 
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implement standards in the first place, creating an uncertain environment for food safety.
93
 
Accordingly, a national food safety system that is inaccurate, incomplete and not-uniform is 
likely to cause oversight failures, with potentially tragic outcomes.
94
    
Quite often, in developing countries, like China, food safety standards are less effective 
because they often lack technical and institutional capacity for effective enforcement.
95
 
However, China’s situation can be improved. The 12th Year-Plan recommends developing 
national uniform standards for detection methods and food packaging materials, as well as 
improving basic research and risk assessments.
96
 China also needs to develop a “safeguarding 
mechanism” by establishing a full time technical organization for national food safety standards 
that is adequately funded and employs a competent panel of skilled researchers and 
professionals.
97
 Even though this may create an additional layer of bureaucracy, China needs to 
cultivate a competent standard team of professionals and a standard research capacity to ensure 
effective and uniform food safety standards that are in line with industry developments and risk 
assessments. 
Despite the problems with the national food standards in the FSL, China does not blindly 
ignore its weaknesses, but in fact recognizes the importance of high food standards as the means 
to regain the trust within China as well as in the international community. Thus, it is particularly 
promising that China now actively participates in formulation of the international food codex, 
                                                            
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Lin, supra note 86, at 658. (“Inadequate technical infrastructure - in terms of food laboratories, human and 
financial resources, national legislative and regulatory frameworks, enforcement capacity, management and 
coordination - weakens the ability to confront these challenges.”) 
96 12th Five-Year Plan, supra note 49.  
97 Id.  
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where it develops a plan with other countries for how to improve food safety and the quality of 
pesticide products.
98
  
B. Too Many Agencies in Charge of Enforcing China’s Food Safety Standards 
In the wake of the melamine crisis, health experts have put the blame for the failure to 
detect food safety problems, on China’s “disjointed” government structure.99 The World Health 
Organization's former top food-safety official, Jorgen Schlundt, emphasized in 2008 before the 
passage of the FSL that China’s authority for food-safety enforcement is "dispersed" among too 
many agencies and different levels of government.
100
  Essentially, China’s regulatory agencies 
operated vertically and failed to communicate or exchange crucial information, which lead to 
substantial loopholes in China’s regulatory system.  
To solve this problem, the FSL directed the State Council to establish the FSC to 
supervise and coordinate the work of regulatory departments under the State Council.
101
 The 
creation of the FSC represented a significant milestone for China, in trying to improve its food 
safety monitoring system. However, the FSL stopped short of reducing or consolidating the 
number of regulatory agencies. It merely defined their duties with more specificity.
102
 According 
to China’s Health Minister, Chen Zhu, there are currently too many regulatory agencies that are 
                                                            
98 Work Sharing, Harmonization, and Technical Assistance, China Collaboration, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/international/worksharing/index.html (“Areas of focus include pesticide registration 
processes and requirements, risk assessment and management procedures and policies, residue chemistry 
requirements, good laboratory practices for conducting studies, and pesticide usage.”) (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
99 Fairclough, supra note 88.  
100 Id. 
101 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 4. See also Shan Juan, New department devoted to food safety, 
CHINADAILY, March 5, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/food/2013-03/05/content_16278075.htm. 
102 Id. art. 4,13,14.( The FSL puts the MOH, GAQSIQ, SAIC, and SFDA in charge of the overall food safety 
coordination, food production, food distribution and catering services, respectively. The FSL also directs the MOH 
to evaluate food safety risks, formulate food safety standards, issue public notifications on food safety, develop 
accreditation norms for food testing agencies and investigate major food safety incidents. The MOH has the leading 
role in handling food safety issues, however, other agencies are also involved.) 
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in charge of implementing approximately 5,000 overlapping and contradictory food safety 
standards, which include national, local and industry standards.
103
   
Institutional overabundance is often plagued by regulatory overlap, and increased 
potential for oversight loopholes.
104
 In addition, having many regulators with overlapping 
authorities unnecessarily raises the cost of regulation.
105
 Thus, under the current FSL, an 
enterprise that not only produces food, but also distributes and offers catering services is subject 
to the regulatory oversight by three different agencies. To remove duplicative jurisdiction and 
economize government funds while continuing to protect people’s health, a new rule needs to be 
developed that would effectively streamline China’s food safety efforts.  
In mid-March of this year, Mr. Ma Kai, China's State Council secretary-general, told the 
NPC that the State Council will reduce the number of ministries and commissions from 27 to 25 
and reorganize several administrative agencies because even though "the State Council has 
established a framework that meets the needs of the socialist market economy, [it] still has 
notable shortcomings".
106
 One of the changes is the incorporation of the SFDA and the State 
Food Safety Office into a food and drug administration that will address increasing public 
concerns about food safety.
107
 The reason for the seventh restructuring attempt in the past thirty 
years is central government’s concern about “duplications of functions, overlapping 
management, low efficiency and bureaucracy”, which to some degree have facilitated instances 
of corruption and dereliction of duty.
108
      
                                                            
103 Lina, supra note 8. 
104 Lina, supra note 86, at 651.  
105 Id. 
106 Fu Shuangqi , China unveils plan to streamline gov't, XINHUA, March 10, 2013, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/10/c_132222066.htm.  
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
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At the local level, the regulatory problems caused by the myriad of executive regulatory 
departments are even more pronounced and the FSL does a relatively poor job of addressing 
those problems. Essentially, the FSL places the authority with the local people’s governments at 
and above county level to establish and enforce a food safety accountability system, and oversee 
and coordinate the regulatory food safety agencies within their respective jurisdictions.
109
 The 
agencies must in turn coordinate with each other and implement and enforce the law.
110
 
Promising on the paper, but challenging in reality, local governments often lack the capacity
111
 
and/or the incentive
112
 to establish effective oversight. Yet, despite the FSL’s well-intended 
mandates directing local governments to formulate and submit emergency plans within their 
jurisdictions to the higher level government in case of serious food safety violations, the FSL has 
not been every effective in addressing the issue of resources and incentives.
113
  
Thus, even though the creation of the FSC and the recent attempts by the State Council to 
restructure current administrative institutions, are "good example[s] of China's institutional 
reform and would facilitate the enforcement of laws and regulations to ensure food safety,"
114
 a 
                                                            
109 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 5. 
110 Id. 
111 Thompson and Ying, Food Safety in China: New Strategies, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, Vol, 1, No. 
2, 2007, at 4. (“Like many things in China, the scope of the food processing industry is huge and hard to measure 
[with approximately 1 million food producers, 70 percent of which employing less than 10 persons]. Regulating 
these small and mobile processors is difficult, particularly as the task generally falls on township and county-level 
officials, rather than better funded and trained provincial and municipal administrators. These micro-enterprises, 
often family businesses, are run out of homes or small rental spaces and have little access to technology, are often 
unknowledgeable about food safety science and international standards.”) 
112 Id. at 6 (“Unscrupulous local officials can benefit from illegal or unlicensed manufacturers, creating a 
disincentive to shutting down violators.  Local governments, particularly in poor regions are reliant on fines for 
income generation, particularly where legitimate tax revenues are inadequate to support government operations.  
Shutting down an illegal manufacturer effectively cuts off a valuable revenue stream, giving the local officials 
incentive to “tax” violators, while simultaneously allowing them to continue operating and generating sales 
revenues.  Additionally, local officials are concerned that shutting down employers or denying farmers the ability to 
make a living can cause social unrest, a state all officials are under pressure to avoid.”) 
113 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 70.  
114 Shan Juan, New department devoted to food safety, CHINADAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/food/2013-
03/05/content_16278075.htm (last updated March 05, 2013).  
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more streamed line approach of consolidating or eliminating agencies is needed to reduce 
oversight loopholes, eliminate overlap between agencies and decrease the cost of regulations.  
C. The FSL Fails to Provide Incentives for Compliance  
Overall, the FSL does a relatively good job in establishing what activities are illegal and 
when individuals, who engage in illegal activities, are subject to civil sanctions or criminal 
penalties. Similarly, the FSL correctly recognizes the weakness in the Chinese food industry and 
addresses violations at the food production and distribution levels, as well as corruption 
problems at the administrative level. However, the law has several noteworthy shortcomings.   
One limitation is China’s inconsistent enforcement of the FSL. Under Article 95 of the 
FSL, if local government officials at the county level or above neglect their duties under the law, 
engage in fraud or corruption and directly cause a food safety incident that has a “serious impact 
on society,” they must be removed from office.115 The language used in this Article implies that 
if the safety incident is not serious, yet a government official has neglected his or her duties 
under the FSL, committed fraud or has been involved in corruption, the official will nonetheless 
be able to retain the current position. In light of the high prevalence of corruption and fraud,
116
 it 
is rather disappointing that the FSL seemingly qualifies the severity of the health hazard. In other 
words, a corrupt official will remain in office provided that the food safety incident does not 
result in casualties. In practice, there is a lack of uniformity in the enforcement of the law. 
Whereas some government officials, involved in food safety incidents, escape criminal 
prosecution,
117
 others receive harsh punishments.
118
  
                                                            
115 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 95. (If the officials or executives are found to have violated the law and 
committed a crime, they can also be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to Art. 98.) 
116 See, Bin Dong, The Consequences of Corruption: Evidences from China, Queensland University of Technology, 
June 22, 2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628567.  
117 Sky Canaves, New Jobs for Officials Punished in China’s Milk Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2010, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/04/10/new-jobs-for-officials-punished-in-chinas-milk-scandal/ (Even 
though, dozens of people were arrested in connection with the melamine incident, not a single government official 
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Another limitation is evident from the FSL’s inability to effectively deter food safety 
violations. At the time the FSL was promulgated, the goal was to insure that cases like melamine 
in the infant formula and clenbuterol contaminated meat will never be repeated. Accordingly, to 
prevent frequent episodes of food safety violations, the FSL focused its attention on harsh 
punishments of individuals, who violate the law.
119
 Even though severe penalties are crucial to 
achieve justice for the victims and are helpful in deterring violations, it is equally important to 
provide positive incentives to individuals, organizations, regulatory agencies and local 
government officials to comply with the law and ensure a safe and healthy food industry.  
Nevertheless, the FSL has not devoted sufficient attention to actual incentives for 
individuals to refrain from committing food safety violations.
120
 This is not to say that the law is 
completely ignorant to the importance of educating individuals involved in food production 
about food safety.
121
 However, the FSL lacks provisions urging individuals involved in the food 
business that compliance with the law will not only benefit consumers, but will offset the cost of 
compliance and ensure higher returns for the food manufacturers and traders in the long run.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
was among them. Bao Junkai, former deputy director general of the food production supervision department of 
A SI , who was disciplined for “slack supervision,” later accepted a position as a party secretary and head of 
A SI ’s Anhui province bureau. Similarly, Liu Daqun, former director of the agricultural department in Hebei 
province, was appointed as mayor and deputy party secretary of the city of Xingtai. See also, Xingtai mayor under 
probe after corruption, CHINADAILY (Dec. 18, 2012), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-
12/18/content_16029902.htm.) (Ironically, Liu Daqun recently resigned as a mayor, after accusation in an online 
post appeared in December 2012 of accepting 5 million yuan ($800,000) from a real estate developer and 8 million 
yuan from a road project contractor.) 
118 Li Qian, Dead, sick pigs used for pork with 2 officials’ OK, SHANGHAIDAILY, July 17, 2012, 
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/nsp/National/2012/07/18/Dead%2Bsick%2Bpigs%2Bused%2Bfor%2Bpork%2Bwit
h%2B2%2Bofficials%2BOK/ (Two food safety officials, Gong Jinlong, a director with Yiwu Food Co in charge of 
business operation, and his cousin Gong Yihua, a local animal quarantine official, have been prosecuted for taking 
bribes to help vendors buy ill and dead pigs. They were charged with fabricating nearly 30 certificates of origin and 
causing 500 unfit pigs to be sold on the market.) 
119 See section I, subsection C supra. 
120 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 84-98.  
121 Id. art. 32. (The FSL does for example direct food manufacturers and distributors to strengthen the training of the 
employees on food safety knowledge.) 
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The main problem the Chinese food industry faces is the lack of trust in the safety of the 
Chinese products.
122
 In addition to poisoned food products, China has also seen an alarming 
growth of counterfeit products in the recent years, such as counterfeit medicine,
123
 eggs
124
 and 
infant formula.
125
 As a result, a growing number of foreign food and dairy companies either 
already entered or are in the process of entering and establishing their presence in China
126
 in 
order to exploit customers’ fear of locally produced products.127 Food safety is no longer a 
burden, but rather a marketing strategy for forward looking companies seeking long-term 
profits.
128
 
                                                            
122 Food, drug industries facing credibility crisis, CHINADAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-
05/05/content_12451201.htm (last updated May 5, 2011). 
123 Jeanne Whalen and Benoit Faucon, Counterfeit Cancer Medicines Multiply, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323320404578211492452353034.html. (“Counterfeiters are 
targeting cancer drugs because of the big profits to be made. While pills such as Viagra, long a favorite of the 
counterfeit trade, cost about $15 to $20 a tablet, a 400-milligram vial of the injectable drug Avastin costs about 
$2,400.”) See also Hou Qiang, Authorities crack 14,000 counterfeit drug cases in 2012, XINHUA, Feb. 20, 2013, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-04/02/c_131503411.htm. (Last year, the SFDA has intensified its 
efforts of cracking down on counterfeit food and medicines. “The SFDA and the Ministry of Public Security jointly 
issued a guideline calling for enhanced coordination between the two agencies in tackling drug-related offences. The 
guideline highlighted prompt exchange on intelligence and quick reaction in performing duties.” In joining its 
efforts with the Ministry of Public Security (“MPS”), the SFDA has captured more than 20,000 individuals involved 
in 14,000 cases suspected of producing and trading counterfeit medicine in 2012. As a result, twenty-eight 
companies were shut down and 228 suspects were arrested for making capsules and gelatin products containing 
excessive chromium.) 
124 Batrick Boehler, Bad Eggs: Another Fake-Food Scandal Rocks China, TIME, Nov. 06, 2012, 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/11/06/how-to-make-a-rotten-egg/ (Guangming Daily reported: “On Sunday, a 
woman who gave her name as Ms. Tian was shopping at a vegetable market in Luoyang, in central China’s Henan 
province, when she noticed a van selling eggs for about 6¢ cheaper than they were going for in supermarkets . 
Assuming that the eggs were from a countryside seller not aware of city prices, she took her chances and bought 2.5 
kg of the bargain eggs — which turned out to be fakes.” According to an anonymous source, the “eggs” were 
entirely manufactured using a mold for a proper shape.) 
125 Matt Siegel, Chinese Safety Concern Empties Distant Shelves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/world/asia/infant-formula-shortage-in-australia-tied-to-chinese-hoarding.html. 
126 Lucy Hornby and Jane Lanhee Lee, China Lures Global Dairy Producers, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/business/global/19iht-inside19.html?pagewanted=all. (“Global food and dairy 
companies are making another round of big bets on the fast-growing Chinese dairy sector, seeking to position 
themselves as safe alternatives after a scandal over deaths from baby formula burned the industry four years ago. 
They are lured by projections of 10 percent annual growth for the sector and by Chinese consumers’ willingness to 
pay a premium for foreign brands as they remain wary of local brands’ safety records.”). 
127 Id. See also Siegel, supra note 125.    
128 Hornby, supra note 126. 
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To prevent losses to China’s food industry due to the tarnished reputation of its domestic 
products,
129
 the FSL must increase its efforts to persuade food manufacturers, and traders that 
food safety is in everyone’s interest in the long run and develop a system for discouraging 
government officials and regulators from taking bribes.
130
   
III. China’s Obstacles In Enforcing The Food Safety Law 
The first two sections of this article have analyzed the FSL, identified its weaknesses and 
made several proposals for how the new law can be improved. The rest of the paper will focus on 
the enforcement obstacles the Chinese government faces in implementing and enforcing the FSL. 
Essentially, the paper argues that even if the FSL’s shortfalls are cured, the Chinese government 
will remain unable to enforce the law due to the following three impediments: China’s local 
economic protectionism; Corruption, unscrupulous practices and deteriorating moral integrity; 
and Environmental influences on food safety.   
A. China’s Local Economic Protectionism 
In order to fully understand how local protectionism undermines successful 
implementation of the FSL, it is critical to appreciate China’s centralized government structure. 
Chinese government is comprised of a central government located in Beijing and a four-level 
hierarchical organizational system of local governments, consisting of provinces, counties, cities 
                                                            
129 Id. See also Chinese fish crisis shows seafood safety challenges, USATODAY, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2007-06-28-fish-cover-usat_N.htm. (last updated July 1, 
2007) (Chinese seafood crisis in 2007 has caused huge losses for the fish industry in China. EU and U.S. have 
placed temporary bans on Chinese fish imports.) 
130 Lijuan Zhang, Boost subsidies to save China's farms, China.org, March 11, 2010, 
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-03/11/content_19588079.htm (The FSL could for example provide greater 
incentives to farmers by increasing farm subsidies. In the past, the Chinese government has invested “too little and 
squeezed too much from the farming sector. So today, Chinese agriculture lags far behind the country's fast growing 
economy and is becoming a costly bottleneck holding back its transitional economy.”). See also Dong, The 
Consequences of Corruption: Evidences from China, and Canavas, supra notes 116, 117 (In addition, the FSL must 
focus on official corruption and provide clear and uniform punishment of government officials who take bribes.) 
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and townships.
131
 As noted in the Section I of this article, the NPC is the “highest organ of state 
power.”132 It has the authority to supervise the work of the State Council, which promulgates 
regulations and submits them to the NPC for the final approval.
133
  
At the local level, government officials are allowed to pass local laws and regulations, 
provided that those are approved by the central government.
134
 The right to pass local laws and 
regulations can be traced back to China’s 1980s agricultural reforms, when China attempted to 
syndicate central planning and market-oriented reforms with the goal to increase production, 
achieve technological advancements and raise the standard of living.
135
 To achieve the desired 
economic and social progress, China introduced the “household responsibility system.”136 
Through this system, land was distributed to the farmers, who were for the first time allowed to 
keep their harvest and submit land rent at a later time.
137
 This development led to dramatic 
increases in China’s productivity.138 At the same time, it led to profound changes in farmers/state 
relations, where the state lost its “direct control” over the farmers.139 To retain some level of 
control, the state began to expand its state administrations at the local level and allowed the local 
                                                            
131 China’s Political System, CHINA.ORG, http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/28842.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 
2013). 
132 See Lawrence, supra note 11. 
133 Id. 
134 Id at 8-9. (Central government allows the provinces to pass laws and regulations that expand national laws, 
however, it does not permit provincial laws and regulations that would be in conflict to the existing national laws 
and regulations. Also, local government are required to report directly to the State Council. Each of the four levels 
reports to the next higher level. So townships report to cities, cities report to counties, counties report to provinces 
and provinces report to the central government in Beijing. Also, provinces do not have their own constitutions and 
lack the power to appoint their own leaders. The central government in Beijing has the sole power to make 
appointments and promotions of provincial officials. To avoid concentration of regional power, Beijing periodically 
rotates provincial leaders from province to province.) 
135 Gregory C. Chow, Economic Reform and Growth in China, Peking University Press, 2004, at 129, available at 
http://down.aefweb.net/AefArticles/aef050107.pdf. 
136 He, Xin. Ideology or Reality?: Limited Judicial Independence in Contemporary Rural China, Australian Journal 
of Asian Law, Vol. 6, No. 3 [213]-230, Dec 2004, at 220 (Initially, the government institutions found their revenue 
streams through either increased taxes and fees for the farmers, or the lucrative township and village enterprises 
(“TVE’s”). The TVE’s were located in more developed townships and villages. In less developed communities, 
where there are no lucrative TVE’s, the farmers financed their local state institutions through higher taxes and fees.) 
137 Id. 
138  Chow, supra note 135, at 129. 
139 Xin, supra note 136, at. 220 
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governments to develop its regional economies and experiment with approved policy methods.
140
 
The reason behind this approval lies in the central government’s overarching objective to 
increase China’s economic growth. 141 In other words, if local governments develop policies that 
help increase China’s GDP, provided, of course, that they conform to Beijing’s rules and 
regulations, China’s central government will not stand in the way of local innovation.  
Accordingly, both central and local governments play an important role in the 
formulation and implementation of food safety regulations. At the central level, the executive 
departments under the State Council must coordinate, evaluate food safety risks, formulate food 
safety standards, investigate major food safety incidents,
142
 and regulate food manufacturing, 
food distribution and catering services in accordance with the set national standards.
143
 At the 
local level, though, the regional governments develop local standards and conduct food 
inspections. Regional governments stand on the forefront of food inspections and are utilized as 
enforcement vehicles for the national and local food safety standards. Accordingly, to ensure a 
successful and efficient implementation of the food safety standards, local governments’ 
cooperation, accountability and integrity are fundamentally important.  
However, there is a lot of skepticism about local official’s integrity and accountability, 
mainly because local officials are appointed by the party members at the next higher level of 
government rather than elected by the people in their communities.
144
 At the sub-national level 
of government, Chinese officials are promoted “almost entirely on the basis of their locality’s 
                                                            
140  Chow , supra note 135, at 220. (Today, nearly every central government institution has a “counterpart” at the 
local level.) 
141See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 8.   
142 Food Safety Law, supra note 4, art. 4, 13,14.  
143 Id. 
144 See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 9. (Also, provinces do not have their own constitutions and lack the power to 
appoint their own leaders. The central government in Beijing has the sole power to make appointments and 
promotions of provincial officials. To avoid concentration of regional power, Beijing periodically rotates provincial 
leaders from province to province.) 
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growth rates.”145 Accordingly, local officials are expected to produce high GDP rates as a 
reflection of their regional economic success.
146
 The pressure to maintain high economic growth 
and the lack of accountability to the local populace creates incentives for local officials to 
exaggerate their economic success,
147
 and to exploit their communities at any cost.
148
  
The fiscal reality of the local governments creates an additional layer of confusion in the 
already muddled Chinese government system. When the central government began expanding its 
institutions after China’s agricultural reforms in the 1980s, it failed to provide sufficient financial 
resources to those institutions, forcing the local governments to look at alternative venues to get 
their revenues.
149
 In today’s China, the local governments’ revenue greatly depends on the 
success of the local enterprises.
 150
  To put it differently, local officials have built symbiotic 
relationships with large local enterprises where both can reap the benefits from a mutual 
cooperation. Thus, local governments benefit from the economic developments that local 
businesses provide, whereas local businesses benefit because local officials are willing to close 
                                                            
145 Carl Minzner, Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in China, Nov. 9, 2009, 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, 2009, Washington U. School of Law Working 
Paper No. 09-11-01, at 66, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502943.    
146 Id. at 76 (There are some efforts by the Chinese central officials to “counteract incentives for local officials to 
grant approval to illegal and environmentally hazardous projects simply to improve their economic development 
scores” through the introduction of “Green GDP,” which is an environmentally-adjusted measure of economic 
growth. Nevertheless, local protectionism remains a big problem for China.) See also Eve Cary, The Curious Case 
of China’s GDP Figures, THE DIPLOMAT, March 5, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/the-curious-case-
of-chinas-gd-figures/ (“[T]here are structural political disincentives to reporting accurate GDP figures at the local 
level.  Local officials are promoted almost entirely on the basis of their locality’s growth rates, giving them a huge 
incentive to report increasing GDP figures, no matter if they are or not. Environmental concerns have also created an 
incentive for officials to lie: higher growth rates, when paired with the amount of coal burned, give the province an 
appearance of greater energy efficiency.”)  
147 Minzner, supra note 145, at 56. 
148 Id at 66. (The most prominent examples include forcing women to have abortion as a mean to achieve target 
goals for allowed number of births in local jurisdictions, and the 2008 melamine contaminated milk incident where 
local officials failed to timely report the incident.) 
149 Xin, supra note 136, at 221.  
150 Thompson, supra note 111, at 5. 
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their eyes on food inspections and food safety regulations.
151
 In addition, even if the central 
government passes new laws and regulations, local officials often complain that they do not have 
the needed financial resources to implement the new rules.
152
 Consequently, because local 
governments are allowed to develop their own economies and lack central government resources 
due to fiscal decentralization,
153
 they have incentives to become overly protective of local 
businesses, which in large parts finance the local regions through high tax revenues.
154
  
One of the most prominent examples of local economic protectionism is the melamine 
tainted formula incident that killed six infants and injured close to three hundred thousand 
others.
155
 At the center of the 2008 scandal was the Sanlu Group (“Sanlu”), a state owned 
Chinese dairy company based in Shijiazhuang, the capital of northern Hebei Province.
156
 Prior to 
the melamine scandal, Sanlu was China's top seller of milk powder for 15 years.
157
 The 2008 
melamine controversy revolved around the industrial chemical melamine, an illegal food additive 
that is used to make fertilizer and industrial piping.
158
 If consumed, melamine can cause kidney 
stones and kidney failure.
159
 Despite its well-known effects,
160
 the chemical has been added to 
watered-down milk to make it appear higher in protein content and sold to dairy companies.
161
  
                                                            
151 Id. (“Local officials are reluctant to close businesses that contribute to employment in rural areas, where other 
economic opportunities are limited.  This reluctance to enforce standards or regulations set at the provincial or 
national level makes it unlikely that food safety can be ensured consistently across the country.”) 
152 Id. (“Food safety enforcement is complicated by weak government capacity, particularly at local levels where 
many food processors operate.  Often, new regulations and dictates from Beijing are unfunded mandates which are 
ignored by local officials who argue they lack resources to carry out directives.  Where some local governments 
might have the will to enforce regulations and standards, they often lack the means.”). See also, Liyan  i and Tom 
Orlik, China's Local Governments Boost Borrowing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595704578241343520236634.html (“China's local 
governments borrowed big in 2009 and 2010, taking debt levels to around 10.7 trillion yuan ($1.7 trillion).”) 
153 See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 8. (Local governments can collect their own revenues and inject their profits into 
education, health, unemployment insurance, social security, and welfare.)   
154 Id. 
155 Gossner, supra note 3. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. 
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According to several published reports, Sanlu Group started receiving complaints about 
the adulteration of its milk with the illegal chemical as early as 2007, but failed to take any 
necessary steps.
162
 Instead, it approved the sale of 813 tons of melamine-tainted milk powder 
between August 2
nd
 and September 12
th
 of 2008, making a profit close to 47.5 million yuan (6.9 
million U.S. dollars).
163
 The officials in Shijiazhuang learned about the contaminated milk in 
August of 2008.
164
 Shockingly, however, they withheld the information from the provincial 
government until September, so as not to interrupt the Beijing Olympics.
165
 Unfortunately, by the 
time the officials initiated nationwide recalls of the tainted milk powder, the damage had already 
been done.
166
  
Investigations into the melamine scandal revealed that at least twenty two dairy 
companies had sold the melamine tainted formula in 2008 and possibly in 2007.
167
 Dozens of 
people, implicated in the intentional adulteration of the milk formula were arrested, including 
milk dealers who sold the tainted milk and middlemen who actually added melamine to the 
watered down milk.
168
 However, only twenty one individuals were held responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
160 David Barboza and Alexei Barrionuevo, Filler in Animal Feed Is Open Secret in China, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
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outbreaks of protests or mass petitions.”)  
166 Gossner, supra note 3, See also David Barboza, Death Sentences in Chinese Milk Case, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/world/asia/23milk.html. (“All the deaths in the scandal so far have been 
linked to Sanlu, which was found to have sold the milk products with the highest melamine concentrations.”) 
167 China executes two over tainted milk powder scandal, BBC NEWS, Nov. 24, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8375638.stm (Chinese government ordered the companies to pay a total of 
1.1bn yuan ($161m) to the hundreds of thousands of families involved.) 
168 Mingxing, supra note 163.  
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incident, with nineteen individuals sentenced to prison terms, including two suspended death 
sentences and two individuals receiving the immediate death penalties.
169
 In addition, more than 
thirty government officials were fired, forced to resign or disciplined.
170
 However, not a single 
government official was arrested or prosecuted.
171
 
Many have blamed Beijing’s lax policies on food safety for the melamine contaminated 
milk incident.
172
 Instead of accepting some responsibility, the central government initially placed 
the blame entirely on unscrupulous dairy company executives, farmers and middlemen.
173
 
However, on August 20, 2008, Hu Jintao, China’s former top official, finally acknowledged that 
“[t]here are ‘painful lessons’ to be drawn from a series of health scares in China” and that 
“[t]hese incidents show that some officials have lost their sense of principals.”174 Not 
surprisingly, two days later, the State Council decided that the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and  uarantine (“GAQSIQ”) had to take the “supervision responsibility 
                                                            
169 Sharon Lafraniere, 2 Executed in China for Selling Tainted Milk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2009, 
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responsible for the scandal.”) See also Zhu Zhe, Quality watchdog chief quits amid milk scandal, CHINADAILY 
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Changjiang, the Party chief of Shijiazhuang was removed for his failure to report the scandal to the higher 
authorities in time and for his incompetent handling of the incident. Also, city mayor, Ji Chuntang, vice-mayor 
Zhang Fawang and three other officials had been removed earlier.) 
171 Fang, supra note 58. 
172 Fairclough, supra note 88 (Even though, the melamine incident occurred prior to the promulgation of the FLS, 
local protectionism remains a big issue post-FSL enactment, mainly because the FSL did not include any specific 
provisions addressing local protectionism and the problems associated with its.)  
173 Zhy Zhe, Dairy farmers 'to blame' for poisoned milk, CHINADAILY, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2008-09/13/content_7024911.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2008) (Official 
blamed the unlawful dairy farmers for the contamination of the milk powder from Sanlu Group.) 
174 China's president castigates local officials over milk scandal, ABS-CBN (Sept. 20, 2008) http://rp1.abs-
cbnnews.com/world/09/20/08/chinas-president-castigates-local-officials-over-milk-scandal  
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for the milk food contamination” and accepted the Li Changjiang’s resignation from the post of 
the GAQSIQ minister.
175
 At his resignation Li Changjiang publicly apologized for the melamine 
tragedy.
176
  
The melamine scandal revealed the extent to which local officials are willing to go in 
order to protect large local employers, like Sanlu.
177
 Local businesses help the local governments 
not only to develop the local economies through job creation and high tax revenues, but also to 
advance local official’s political careers.178 According to a patent infringement investigator in 
China, “local governments are always watching out for their local companies and the bigger the 
company, the bigger the sway they’ll have.”179 Despite the FSL’s effort to strengthen oversight 
and impose stricter food safety laws and regulations, there is no solution in the FSL for how to 
address the problem of local protectionism and officials’ self-serving incentives. Likewise, the 
FSL does not offer any fiscal solutions for how local governments can implement the new 
rules.
180
 Consequently, as long as these problems remain unresolved, local protectionism will 
likely continue to be a serious obstacle to the FSL enforcement.  
B. Corruption, Unscrupulous Practices And Deteriorating Moral Integrity  
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Corruption has permeated every sector of the Chinese society, including “politics, 
economy, ideology and culture.”181 It presents one of the greatest obstacles to China’s 
development in terms of food quality and safety.
182
 The main problem is that corruption 
undermines government’s policies by encouraging opportunistic conduct of officials and private 
actors that result in the violation of the food safety regulatory laws.
183
 Therefore, understanding 
the causes of corruption and establishing anticorruption policies is essential in ensuring an 
effective compliance with food safety laws and regulations.  
On November 8, 2012, Hu Jintao, the former Chinese leader, cautioned in his speech at 
the 18
th
 Party Congress that if China does not effectively deal with corruption, it could 
undermine and destroy China’s ruling Communist Party and the state.184 Thus, “combating 
corruption and promoting political integrity, which is a major political issue of great concern to 
the people is a clear cut and long term political commitment of the Party.”185  
In cautioning about the destructive consequences of corruption, Hu Jintao called for a 
“system of combating corruption through both punishment and prevention” and stressed that the 
government should strengthen education about tackling corruption.
186
 He also emphasized the 
necessity for a “system of accountability for improving Party conduct and upholding integrity” 
and warned that “all those who violate Party discipline and state laws, whoever they are and 
whatever power or official position they have, [] be brought to justice without mercy.”187 
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Despite the encouraging rhetoric, China’s success at preventing corruption remains 
relatively low. The FSL’s efforts to curtail the prevalence of corruption in the food industry are 
still rather limited.
188
 There are several explanations for the relatively high prevalence of 
corruption in China.  
Research suggests that corruption is high whenever bureaucrats have discretionary power 
associated with the “economic rents”189 and the deterrence to such corruption, is lacking or 
“worth the risk”.190 Discretionary power increases with government size and the amount of 
regulations.
191
 However, on its own, it does not pose a significant threat. In order for 
discretionary power to lead to corruption, it must relate to economic rents.
192
 An important 
source of economic rent is the absence of competition in economic activities.
193
 Thus, if 
competition increases, economic rents decline, eliminating the marginal benefit individuals gain 
from paying bribes.
194
 In regards to deterrence of corruption, research shows that higher 
education and income, as well as the effectiveness of the country’s legal system and press 
freedom affect the probability of detection of corruption.
195
 
                                                            
188 Mu Xuequan, China investigates 57 government staff involved in food safety cases, XINHUA, May 24, 2011, 
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190 Dong, The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China, supra note 62 at 5-8. (Dong described deterrence to 
corruption as a function of the probability of being caught and the penalty for corrupt act. Thus, deterrence to 
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191 Id. (Higher number of regulations promotes the incidence of corruption. In addition, increasing government size 
heightens the discretionary power by expanding the social resources.) 
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193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. (“Higher level of income accelerates the spread of education and democratic institutions and therefore 
enhances individuals’ political involvement. It consequently enables private individuals to better identify corrupt 
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34 
 
In applying these research findings to China, local protectionism,
196
 has provided 
significant insights into discretionary powers of local officials in developing local economies, 
and deciding what policies will benefit their local communities.
197
 In addition, it shed light on 
how the symbiotic relationship between local officials and regional business enterprises 
promotes rent-seeking behavior, where corrupt officials often use their authority for personal 
gain.
198
 Accordingly, discretionary power coupled with economic rents directly contributes to the 
pervasiveness of corruption. However, unless there is a serious food safety incident, official 
corruption often remains undetected.
199
  
One of the reasons for the high prevalence of corruption is the inconsistent application 
and enforcement of the laws. Whereas some officials receive harsh punishments, others escape 
prosecution altogether. For example, while Mr. Zheng Xiaoyu, a former SFDA chief, was 
executed for taking bribes in 2007, local officials involved in the 2008 melamine contaminated 
milk incident, have completely escaped criminal prosecutions.
200
 Even though the local officials 
chose to engage in a cover-up weeks before the story went to print and admitted the oversight 
failures, including the obligation to report the incident to the higher authorities, not a single one 
of them was criminally charged.
201
 As such, the inconsistent application of the laws creates a 
perception that the probability of being caught for corrupt acts is relatively low. 
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However, in regards to the penalties for corrupt acts, China has shown greater 
consistency. China has one of the most rigorous punishment systems in the world, executing 
thousands of prisoners each year.
202
 One of the well-publicized executions of a central 
government official was the case of Zheng Xiaoyu, a former SFDA chief, who was executed in 
2007 after being found guilty of corruption.
203
 Zheng Xiaoyu worked as a head of the SFDA 
from 1998 until 2005, when he was charged and found guilty for taking bribes to approve 
inferior medications, such as an antibiotic that was found to have caused the death of at least ten 
individuals.
204
 The court sentenced him to death with a two-year reprieve.
205
 However, after the 
two-year suspension, in an unusual turn of events, the Supreme Court ordered his immediate 
execution.
206
 Such an extraordinarily harsh punishment of a central government official was 
unusual, even for China. Yet, it reflected on Beijing’s determination to maintain a perception of 
integrity and a commitment to its own people that no official, no matter how high the rank, can 
escape from justice.
207
   
Showing their efforts to crackdown on corruption, four Chinese government agencies 
have jointly released a circular in 2010, endorsing harsher punishment for food safety crimes.
208
 
The circular promised more severe punishments for corrupt government officials who accept 
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09/16/content_11311316.htm (last updated Sep. 16, 2010). 
36 
 
bribes and protect or ignore food safety.
209
 In addition the document declared that “[g]enerally, 
officials who are involved in food safety crimes should not be given a reprieve or be exempt 
from criminal punishment.”210  
A similar language was used earlier this year by, Mr. Xi Jinping, general secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (“CPC”), who swore to fight against 
corruption.
211
 He declared before the CPC that the “power should be restricted by the cage of 
regulations.”212 That is, the government should develop a “disciplinary, prevention and guarantee 
mechanism” to discourage individuals from committing corruption.213 Especially encouraging, is 
Xi Jinping’s determination to "fight every corrupt phenomenon [and] punish every corrupt 
official, [] so as to earn people's trust with actual results."
214
 In addition, the CPC general 
secretary demanded "no exception [] when it comes to Party disciplines and law” and promised 
to investigate cases completely and without leniency for anyone involved.
215
  
The aspirational words of Hu Jintao and the commitment of Xi Jinping to the fight 
against corruption, strongly resonate with the Chinese people.
216
 According to the 2012 Pew 
Global Attitudes China Project polls, fifty percent of Chinese blame corrupt officials and thirty 
percent blame corrupt businesses for China’s problems.217 These public concerns are merited in 
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light of the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index that places China in 80
th
 place out of 176 
countries for being one of the most corrupt nations to do business.
218
  
In an attempt to regain the public trust, China’s Premier en Jiabao, publicly announced 
that there is a need for “moral training” in the food industry to eliminate corruption and ensure 
food safety.
219
 Moral training was included in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan and directed the FSC 
to require training for all incoming workers in the food production industry.
220
 The training is 
one of the authorities' efforts to restore the country's food industry.
221
 However, unless China 
eliminates opportunities for rent-seeking behavior among officials and ensures consistent 
application and enforcement of its laws, the prevalence of corruption will remain high. China 
needs to firmly establish that the probability of being caught and the consequences, in terms of 
punishment and financial losses for those who commit illegal acts, are high. 
C. Environmental Influences on Food Safety  
With yearly GDP rates of at least 7.5 percent,
222
 China’s rapid and persistent economic 
growth has catapulted it in to the second place on the list of the world’s largest economies, 
behind the US.
223
 However, China’s economic success has led to profound domestic 
environmental consequences.
224
 For example, China’s pollution affects millions of people 
directly, who suffer from various diseases due to immediate exposure to the toxins in the air and 
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the drinking water.
225
 China’s pollution also affects millions of people indirectly through the 
consumption of ecologically contaminated foods.
226
 Accordingly, environmental degradation 
poses a sizeable obstacle to the ability of the Chinese government to enforce its food safety laws. 
There is a growing concern among environmentalists about food safety in China, due to 
the use and overuse of pesticides and fertilizers on China’s farm lands.227 The main reason for 
the high use of pesticides and fertilizers among the Chinese farmers is the year-round planting of 
crops, which leaves China’s soil without any natural nutrients.228 According to the Chinese 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences (“CAAS”), fifty percent of China’s agricultural land currently 
exceeds the internationally accepted limits of nitrogen fertilizer.
229
 The benefit of using 
fertilizers is that it helps China to achieve high yields of grain harvests to insure food security for 
a country of billion people.
230
 However, the overuse of fertilizers and pesticides causes severe 
land degradation and decreases crop diversity.
231
 To make matters worse, the unabsorbed 
fertilizers penetrate the soil and cause widespread groundwater nitrate pollution, making the 
water unsafe to drink.
232
 Thus, “aquaculture production” is of particular concern to the people in 
China, the Chinese government, and the scientists.
233
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In addition to nitrate pollution, improper industrial disposal of electronic and plastic 
waste chemicals as well as heavy metals such as cadmium, arsenic, mercury and petroleum 
organic compounds, adulterate both: farm land and the nation’s rivers.234 According to the 
research findings conducted by the CAAS, “about 16 percent of China's 120 million hectares of 
farm land had suffered from pollution at different levels and 10 million hectares were polluted by 
industrial pollutants.
235
 Likewise, a large percentage of China’s rivers is “so contaminated that it 
should not even be touched, yet tremendous amounts of grains, vegetables, and fruits that are 
served in homes and restaurants, as well as textiles that are sold in markets, are irrigated with 
untreated industrial wastewater.”236 As one farmer from the Shandong Province has explained, 
“there is no water source except for this dirty water. e have to use it.”237 He admitted of using 
water contaminated with chemicals to the extent that it appeared black during irrigation.
238
 And 
even though most of the crop perished after being irrigated with contaminated water he and other 
farmers sold whatever crop has survived.
239
  
In recent years most of the attention undeniably went to the news reports on adulterated 
rice - the staple of the Chinese diet - by heavy metals in the polluted soil.
240
 One of the heavy 
metals found in rice was cadmium, which has been associated with bone and joint pains and in 
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some cases kidney failures.
241
 In response to the public outrage, the Chinese government 
promised to take necessary steps, such as setting “nationally significant standards for water, soil, 
and food” to tackle the problem of toxic rice.242 However, according to a professor in agriculture 
from the university in Nanjing, the severity and the pervasiveness of soil and groundwater 
contamination is so substantial that “the pollutants will stay in the soil for hundreds of years 
without a proper treatment.”243 In some instances the damage may even be “irreversible.”244 Not 
surprisingly, some experts, like Fan Mingyuan, of the Water Resources Research Institute of 
Shandong Province, conclude that the “crop security is the number one problem in the nation.”245   
Similar to adulterated rice, the Chinese fishery business is greatly affected by industrial 
waste, sewage and agricultural runoffs.
246
 One of Fuqing eel and shrimp farmers in the Fujian 
Province described the local rivers as “filthy”.247 Faced with the toxic waters, fish farmers have 
taken drastic measures in 2007 and began adding veterinary drugs and pesticides into the fish 
feed to safe their stocks and secure their revenue.
248
 Yet, drugs and pesticides leave “poisonous 
and carcinogenic residues in seafood, posing health threats to consumers.”249 When the European 
Union, Japan and the United States have partially or completely refused imports of Chinese fish 
in 2007, after finding traces of illegal drugs, the fish farmers stopped using the medicine.
250
 
However, many farmers had to see their subsistence threatened as their incomes declined due to 
“a 30 percent decline in survival rates of their fish and other seafood.”251  
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The legislative response to environmental degradation has been considerable.
252
 The NPC 
has enacted numerous environmental laws and regulations in the past several decades.
253
 
However, as with the FSL, the effectiveness of the environmental laws and regulations is 
reduced by improper adherence and enforcement.
254
 As a result, China’s environment continues 
to deteriorate.
255
  
China’s water and soil pollution “are so prevalent that the nation’s farm productivity, its 
economy, and the people’s health are at risk as modernization, urbanization, and food demand 
are steadily increasing.”256 China’s strong emphasis on economic growth, coupled with 
ineffective enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, has led to severe environmental 
degradation and has caused problems for the Chinese food industry, harming the country’s 
economy.
257
 Chinese experts have stressed that their government needs to refocus its economic 
development agenda and adjust its policies in light of the country’s growing environmental 
decay.
258
 The FSL imposes stricter national food safety standards, yet it completely ignores the 
reality of China’s environmental deterioration. There are no provisions in the FSL focusing on 
how food safety laws can be implemented and enforced if, for instance, the farmers are forced to 
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irrigate their harvest with or raise their stocks of fish in contaminated water. Accordingly, 
China’s environmental pollution poses a sizable challenge for the government in enforcing the 
laws on food safety.  
IV. Conclusion 
As the second largest economy in the world, China has the responsibility to its own 
people and to the world community to work out a comprehensive food safety plan. The FSL 
represents a significant legislative commitment toward ensuring uniform national food safety 
standards, and creating a new governmental body dedicated to food safety oversight and 
enforcement. The FSL also imposes harsher penalties for food producers, traders and 
government officials, who are directly responsible for food safety violations.  
However, the FSL has significant limitations that fail to fully address the root causes of 
China’s food safety. First, the law allows the local governments and various food industries to 
develop their own food safety standards, which aggravates the existing problem of inconsistent 
and duplicative standards on food safety. Second, the law also does not make an effort to 
consolidate the various executive agencies under the State Council, which are a direct source of 
regulatory loopholes. And third, the FSL does not adequately deter food producers, traders and 
government officials from engaging in illegal food practices.  
Moreover, the success of the FSL appears to be thwarted by various enforcement 
obstacles. First, the problem of local protectionism appears to be so pervasive in China’s 
governmental structure that it seems impossible to tackle the problem without major institutional 
changes. The central government has to address the problem of accountability to ensure that the 
officials are acting in the best interest of their communities and do not exploit their official and 
powerful positions for personal gains. Second, China must improve its problems with corruption 
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and unscrupulous practices. There is a great need for China to ensure that its laws are applied and 
enforced consistently to enhance the deterrence effect. Finally, the central government in Beijing 
must refocus its economic growth plan in light of the country’s environmental degradation, and 
ensure an effective implementation and enforcement of its environmental laws. In the end, the 
safety of China’s food can only be achieved if the ecological conditions are dramatically 
improved.  
Ensuring food safety is not an easy task for a country of billion people that rose, in only 
three decades, to one of the most powerful nations in the world. However, to maintain and 
strengthen its economic muscle, China must address crucial domestic deficiencies including 
major problems in its food sector. 
